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punity" are not compatible legal bedfellows, and that a litigant claiming both will not be regarded in a favorable light.
The dominant owner who insists on increasing the flow in
furtherance of his improvement rights while flatly refusing
to reconsider any moderation of his plans can expect a strict
application of the limitations on his right of drainage similar to those applied in the Battisto"7 case.
The dominant owner may increase the flow, incident to
an improvement, until property rights of the servient
owner are infringed. The upper owner assumes the risk
of judicial wrath whenever he acts, but only in court can
he determine whether his actions rendered him liable.
Predictability in judicial decisions has an uncertain rating
in surface water cases. However, the civil law rule with
its limitations and the reasonable use rule, both of which
Maryland has adopted, are each in themselves, free from
any ambiguity. The lack of predictability here stems from
the uncertainty of not knowing in advance which rule the
Court will apply. This lack of certainty, however, may not
necessarily be undesirable. In fact, it may be asserted that
unpredictability is even good in that it tends to engender
a greater degree of equitable conduct on the part of the
parties. If the instant case is really a departure from the
usual limitations under the civil law rule as based upon
the reasons outlined therein, still the application was made
in a case where a municipality was the dominant landowner, and the broad configurations of the civil law rule's
limitations in use in Maryland will probably remain unchanged for private dominant landowners in surface water
cases.
LERoY HANDWERGER
RICHARD E. LOVELL
Property Tax Assessments - Invalid Discrimination
Between Real And Personal Property Valuation
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Commission1
The taxpayer, Sears, maintains a number of retail establishments throughout the State of Maryland. It appealed
from an assessment of its tangible personal property, levied
21Supra, n. 18. In that case, plaintiff sued for damages caused by precipitations of mud and debris through increased flow of rain water from
defendants' higher land as an alleged result of regrading and building
activities. Defendants refused to afford the plaintiffs more than token
protection from such inundations. The Court awarded the plaintiffs damages equal to the cost of restoration of the premises.
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (Md., 1957).
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by the State Tax Commission, for failure to deduct from
the assessment an allowance for the impact of inflation on
the value of its stock in trade, such allowance having been
deducted in the assessment of real estate.2 The lower court
affirmed the decision of the Commission. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded,3 finding an intentional and
arbitrary discrimination.
The taxpayer's chief contention was that the Maryland
legislature had classified real and personal property alike,
4
directing that all property be assessed at "full cash value ";
therefore, the same standard of value or economic yardstick should be applied to both, i.e., since an allowance for
inflationary factors was deducted from actual value in the
assessment of real property to arrive at "full cash value",
such an allowance should be permitted in the valuation of
stock in trade.
The Commission, on the other hand, contended in the
main that inherent differences between real property and
stock in trade justified the use of different methods of
assessment.5 Furthermore, the legislature had specifically
'The taxpayer demonstrated below, and the parties stipulated on appeal,
that real property throughout the state was assessed at varying percentages
of actual current value, so as to eliminate "inflationary influences". Two
extensive studies, one prepared by a Committee of the Maryland Association of Assessing Officers and the other prepared by experts employed by
the taxpayer, were utilized to show the ratios of assessments to current
values of realty in the counties and in Baltimore City. The ratios ranged
from approximately twenty-five per cent to sixty per cent. No such deduction was made in the assessment of stock in trade, which was generally
valued at the lower of cost or market. It was also shown that inventory
values were affected by inflation in much the same way as real estate
values.
0The chronology of the case is of some interest: notice of tentative
assessment (Sept. 18, 1952) ; tentative assessment made final (April 23,
1954) ; appeal to Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City (May, 13, 1954) ;
report of auditor and master (James A. Latane) (Sept. 22, 1955) ; opinion
of lower court (Cullen, J.) (February 13, 1957) ; order of lower court
filed (March 11, 1957) ; opinion of Court of Appeals filed (November 22,
1957).
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 81:
Section 13(a). "Except as hereinafter provided, all property directed
in this Article to be assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value
thereof on the date of finality .. ."
Section 14: "The stock in business of every person, firm or corporation engaged in any manufacturing or commercial business in this State
shall be valued and assessed to the owner thereof on the date of finality
at its fair average value for the twelve months preceding the date of
finality. .. ."
The portions quoted are unchanged in the 1957 Supplement.
5 The Commission relied on a series of prior State taxation decisions by
the Court of Appeals, illustrating the wide latitude permitted Maryland
taxing officials in determining the proper methods of valuation of property
for assessment purposes. See Commercial Corp. v. Tax Comm., 181 Md. 234,
29 A. 2d 294 (1942) ; State Tax Comm. v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 193 Md. 22 66 A.
2d 477 (1949) ; Tax Comm. v. Brandt Cabinet Works, 202 Md. 533, 97 A. 2d
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provided that stock in trade should be valued at "fair average value for the twelve months preceding the date of
finality",6 thus constituting an exception to the mandate
of "full cash value". Since the taxpayer had not shown
that the valuation of its stock in trade resulted in an assessment at more than fair average value, the Commission
concluded that its refusal to permit an allowance for inflation in the case of inventories was not clearly unlawful,
unreasonable or against the weight of the evidence.
The Court of Appeals, in a landmark decision in the area
of Maryland property taxation, ruled that while the Commission may use different methods of assessment in valuing
different types of property, the statute requires that it
apply the standard of "full cash value" to all types of
property. The Court rejected the Commission's contention that "fair average value" constituted an exception
to the general rule of "full cash value". Rather, the term
"fair average" merely indicated the legislative intent that
inventories, which fluctuate in both quantity and price
during a given period, be valued on a representative basis,
taking fluctuations into account.
The Court was also faced with a line of Maryland decisions holding that the remedy of a taxpayer complaining
of a lower assessment to others on similar property was
not to have his own assessment reduced, but to seek an increase in the assessments of the other taxpayers. 7 The ade290 (1953) ; Household Finance v. Tax Comm., 212 Md. 80, 128 A. 2d 640
(1957) ; May Stores v. State Tax Comm., 213 Md. 570, 132 A. 2d 593 (1957).
These cases, however, did not involve a discrimination problem similar to
the one in the instant case.
O Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, §14.
"In Steam Packet Co. v. Baltimore, 161 Md. 9, 155 A. 158 (1931), a
corporate taxpayer contended that its property had been overassessed, since
it had not been permitted an exemption allowed to its competitors. The
Court of Appeals, in denying the exemption, stated at p. 22:
"Upon a full consideration of the contentions of the appellant, it
would seem that its real complaint is that it is now taxed, while competitors are exempt, resulting in a pecuniary advantage to the competitors over it to the extent of the tax which it is required to pay.
If this be true, its remedy lies, not in attempting to be relieved of the
tax itself, but in restraining the proper taxing officials from allowing
the exemption to its competitors. Every taxpayer has a financial interest in seeing that all property in the state, properly the subject
of taxation, should be taxed, because, by increasing the taxable basis,
the rate necessary for the production of the expenses of the state and
local governments will be reduced, and the individual's tax correspondingly lowered."
See also Schley v. Lee, 106 Md. 390, 67 A. 252 (1907) ; County Comm'rs. of
A. A. Co. v. Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A. 2d 672, 5 A. L. R. 2d 569 (1948);
State Tax Comm. v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 193 Md. 222, 235, 66 A. 2d 477 (1949);
Tax Comm. v. Brandt Cabinet Works, 202 Md. 583, 97 A. 2d 290 (1953).
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quacy of such a remedy has been sternly criticized.8 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held, under factually similar circumstances, that such a remedy
is tantamount to no remedy at all, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.9
While not expressly overruling the procedural remedy
adopted in the prior Maryland cases, the Court of Appeals
rejected the contention that the taxpayer's sole remedy
was to appeal under-assessed realty. Citing the leading
Supreme Court cases in the area, the Court reversed the
order below which had denied the allowance of a deduction for inflationary influences in the valuation of the taxpayer's personal property.
The problem of property assessment at less than actual
value is not peculiar to Maryland. Similar practices by
assessing officials have given rise to equally perplexing
problems in other jurisdictions. 10 As in the instant case,
little or no reasonable justification can be offered in sup8Lewis, The Tam Articles of the Maryland Declarationof Rights, 13 Md.
L. Rev. 83, 108, 109 (1953). The lack of monetary incentive in seeking a
rise in his neighbor's assessment will render such a remedy largely ineffective. Furthermore, practical difficulties of timely investigation and proof
will tend to make the remedy wholly unworkable.
1In Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), a Nebraska
corporation complained that its property had been assessed at one hundred
per cent of its true value, while all other property in the taxing district
had been valued at fifty-five per cent. The state court ruled that even if
such discrimination were proven, the taxpayer had no remedy except to
have the property assessed below its true value raised, rather than to have
the property assessed at its true value reduced. The Supreme Court replied:
"... such a result as that reached by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
is to deny the injured taxpayer any remedy at all because It is utterly
impossible for him by any judicial proceeding to secure an increase in
the assessment of the great mass of under-assessed property in the taxing district. This court holds that the right of a taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 per cent. of its true value is to have his
assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are
taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute"
(446).

See also Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 623 (1946).
Following the Supreme Court decisions in the area, several state courts
adopted the indicated approach, often overturning a prior contrary position. See, for example, Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Bd. of
Tax., 16 N. J. 329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954) ; and State v. Alabama Power Co.,
254 Ala. 327, 48 So. 2d 445 (1950). In spite of the non-committal language
of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, it would seem that Maryland
has now Joined this group.
10 "The assessing of property at a fraction of its actual value undoubtedly is so widespread that most, if not all, of the municipalities in
the state pursue the practice. This rule of assessment has been tolerated
for so long a time that it has acquired the respectability of assumed
legality."
E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn.
374, 132 A. 2d 563, 565 (1957).
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port of fractional valuation, especially where a greater proportionate deduction is afforded one taxpayer or class of
taxpayers, as compared to another.
Although such a practice almost invariably violates the
state constitutional or statutory mandate to assess at "full",
"true" or "actual" value, most of the courts which have
been confronted with the problem condone fractional valuation so long as a uniform percentage is applied consistently
to each assessment." Occasionally, however, even a longestablished system of valuation at less than full value will
be condemned, and the assessors' conduct deemed illegal.1"
The Maryland decision, in comparison, would seem to fit
into the former category.
Where, on the other hand, unequal percentages of valuation are applied to differing classes of property or taxpayers, a court faces a serious dilemma. To deny an abatement to a complainant whose property has been assessed
at a proportionately higher valuation than other similarly
classified property is to permit an unjust discrimination to
go unremedied. 13 On the other hand, to grant a reduction
in the petitioner's assessment is to commit a judicial violation of the express statutory command of actual value.
The generally prevailing view, in both federal and state
courts, adopts the latter approach, deeming the removal
of the discrimination preferable to a non-remedial adherence to the statutory direction of actual value. 4
"The statute and the assessor's oath contemplate the assessor's
valuation will be 100% of such theoretical sale price, but no taxpayer
can be considered aggrieved by discrimination if the assessment is
some fraction of such value, applied uniformly to all property."
State v. City of Evansville, 261 Wis. 599, 53 N. W. 2d 795, 800 (1952). See
also: Delaware Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co. v. Neeld, 23 N. J. 561,
130 A. 2d 6 (1957) ; Bemis Bros. Co. v. Claremont, 98 N. H. 446, 102 A. 2d
512 (1954); Anderson's Red & White Store v. Kootenai County, 70 Ida.
260, 215 P. 2d 815 (1950) ; Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 72 Ida.
344, 241 P. 2d 167 (1952).
2E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, eapra, n. 10. See
also Switz v. Middletown Twp., 23 N. J. 580, 130 A. 2d 15 (1957), for a detailed study in New Jersey's property tax assessment problems, where
the court indicated the pressing need for a state-wide revaluation.
See discussion, n. 9, supra.
"... the requirement that all property be assessed at Its actual cash
value is secondary to the [state] constitutional mandate of equality of
taxation." Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, supra, n. 11, 169.
Bracketed material supplied.
"... where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true
value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter
requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the
law."
Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, supra, n. 9, 446. To the same effect,
see Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 (1931); Delaware
U
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A few cases in other jurisdictions present factually
similar circumstances to the real property-personal property discrimination problem which faced the Maryland
Court of Appeals. In Bemis Bros v Claremont," the taxing
authorities assessed stock in trade at one hundred per cent
of current value, while other property was valued at various lesser percentages. The New Hampshire court found
no legal basis for such a discrimination, and held the taxpayer entitled to an abatement of its stock in trade assessment.'8 In Anderson's Red & White Store v. Kootenai
County," stocks of merchandise were assessed at twenty
per cent of actual value, while other property was valued
at lesser percentages. In remanding for a recomputation
to equalize the plaintiff's assessment of merchandise with
the assessments of other property, the Idaho court said:
"But after having considered all of the relevant factors affecting the value of the different classes and
items of property, and having arrived at the current
value, if the result is not entered as the assessed value,
and the assessor decides that the 'full cash value' contemplated by statute is less than the value so arrived
at, he must assess all property at the same proportion
of its market or other actual current value."' 8
This doctrine was reaffirmed in Chastain'sInc. v. State Tax
Commission." Substantially the same rationale was employed by The Wisconsin Court in State v. City of Evansville,'20 and by The Maine Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co. v. Neeld, supra, n. 11; Hutchins v.
Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S. E.2d 183 (1955). Contra: R. Ingraham Company
v. Town and City of Bristol, supra, n. 10.

Supra, n. 11.
"The remedy indicated, however, was unusual. The Court rejected the
complainant's contention that its stock in trade assessment should be
diminished by a deduction proportionate to that permitted for other property. Rather, the Court determined the ratio of assessed to actual value of
aU property in the taxing district, and then permitted only so much of
a reduction as would bring the ratio of assessed to actual value of all the
taxpayer's property to a common level. The relief granted was thereby
much reduced. The remedy is, perhaps, somewhat questionable. The
amount of a reduction will vary in any given instance according to the
relative proportions in which a taxpayer owns the separate types of property, as compared to the proportions in which the categories of property are
owned in the taxing district as a whole. The complainant's burden may be
reduced to the level of the tax burden of a hypothetical "average" taxpayer,
but uniformity between the classes of property is not achieved.
1170 Ida. 260, 215 P. 2d 815 (1950).
'8 Ibtd, 818.
19Supra, n. 11.
Supra, n. 11.
is
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Inhabitantsof City.2 ' However, in an uncommon deviation
from the generally accepted approach, The Connecticut
Court in E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol,22 where assessors valued realty at fifty per cent of
actual value and personalty at ninety per cent, held that
the unambiguous language of the taxing statutes permitted
the proper use of no value other than the actual value of
the property; but, overruling a prior decision of long standing,2" the court refused to grant the complainant taxpayer
a reduction in the assessment of its personalty since, to
illegal violation of the
do so, would condone the assessor's
24
statutory command of full value.
Most of the decisions in this area are based on a construction of state constitution uniformity provisions. 5
Occasionally, as in the instant Maryland decision,20 a court
will rest primarily upon a construction of the applicable
statutes." A few cases purport to add, at least in dicta,
that discriminatory assessments of similarly classified property violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 28 The opinion of
21150 Me. 181, 107 A. 2d 475, 480 (1954) :
"The law requires equality, and requires that each property owner
pay his just proportion of taxes. The law requires that real estate and
tangible personal property be valued on an equal basis 'according to the
just value thereof'. The law requires that there be no favoritism nor
discrimination. The law requires that when a percentage of the true
value is taken for taxation purposes, the percentage be uniform and
equal on all real estate and tangible property."
144 Conn. 374, 132 A. 2d 563 (1957).
a Randell v. City of Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 A. 523 (1893).
" From a standpoint of statutory construction, there can be no doubt that
the Connecticut court's decision is correct and proper. But from the complaining taxpayer's standpoint, the past discrimination to his detriment is
left unabated by the refusal to grant a reduction in the protested assessments. Query, whether the court's failure to provide an effective remedy
violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution? See discussion, n. 9, supra.
5Delaware Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co. v. Neeld, 23 N. J. 561,
130 A. 2d 6 (1957) ; Bemis Bros. v. Claremont, 98 N. H. 446, 102 A. 2d 512
(1954) ; Anderson's Red & White Store v. Kootenai County, 70 Ida. 260,
215 P. 2d 815 (1960) ; State v. City of Evansville, 261 Wis. 599, 53 N. W. 2d,
795 (1952) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Inhabitants of City, supra, n. 21.
"The uniformity provision of the Maryland Constitution - Article 15.
of the Declaration of Rights - was but faintly urged by the taxpayer and
was not even mentioned by the Court of Appeals in the instant case. The.
scant reliance upon Article 15 is probably due to the considerable confusion
surrounding its present legal status. For a complete analysis of the problem, see 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 424 (1952), and Lewis, The Tao Articles of the
Maryland
Declarationof Rights, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
TM
E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132
A. 2d 563 (1957).
2
"For want of uniformity in taxable values, the assessments made
against the property of the plaintiff, the intervenors, and other similarly
situated taxpayers are null and void; they are clearly violative of the
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the Court of Appeals in the instant case alluded in an extremely vague manner to such a possibility, but sidestepped
a clear holding on the federal question; the issue had not
been vigorously pressed. The problem is one of no slight
difficulty. The leading Supreme Court cases deal primarily
with discrimination as to a particular taxpayer, 29 and not
with varying treatment of classes of property. However,
in view of the fact that the Maryland Court of Appeals has
now decided, as its interpretation of the statute, that real
and personal property have been similarly classified by the
Legislature, and must therefore receive equivalent treatment, there is a reasonable probability that the discriminatory assessments of the State Tax Commission constituted
not only a violation of the Maryland taxing statutes, but
an infringement of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
The decision in the instant case will exert considerable
impact upon the revenue and tax structure of the state.
There is no simple solution to the equalization problem
posed."0 A complete reappraisal by the legislature of the
Maryland property tax assessment situation is indicated.
NELSON B. SEIDMAN
uniform - taxation clause of our Constitution and the equal-protection
clauses of our present Constitution and the Federal Constitution."
Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S.E. 2d 183, 186-187 (1955).
See also Delaware Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co. v.
Neeld, supra, n. 25.
"
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to secure every person within the State's Jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents. And it must be regarded as settled that intentional
systematic undervaluation by State officials of other taxable property
in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon
thefull value of his property."
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352-353 (1918). See also
Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907); Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Board, 284 U. S.23 (1931) ; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260
U. S.441 (1923) ; Hilsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S.620 (1946). But see
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S.362 (1940).
10Following the decision in the Ingraham case, supra, n. 27, a bill was
introduced into the Connecticut legislature purporting to validate prior
fractional valuations, preserve rights of appeal, and provide for uniform
assessments. The Maryland Legislature, in turn, may soon be faced with
a proposed enactment attempting to separately classify real and personal
property, permitting valuation at different percentages of actual value.
Such legislation may be constitutionally questionable. It is reasonably
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution will impose no insuperable bar. See Bell's Gap R'd. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S.
232 (1890), and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.v. Browning, 310 U. S.362 (1940).
On the other hand, Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights may,
short of constitutional amendment, present more serious obstacles. See
37 Op. Atty. Gen. 424 (1952), and Lewis, supra, n. 26.

